David Thorstad: Bounded Rationality and the Case Against Longtermism

Episode 122I spoke with Professor David Thorstad about:* The practical difficulties of doing interdisciplinary work* Why theories of human rationality should account for boundedness, heuristics, and other cognitive limitations* why EA epistemics suck (ok, it’s a little more nuanced than that)Professor Thorstad is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University, a Senior Research Affiliate at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford, and a Research Affiliate at the MINT Lab at Australian National University. One strand of his research asks how cognitively limited agents should decide what to do and believe. A second strand asks how altruists should use limited funds to do good effectively.Reach me at [email protected] for feedback, ideas, guest suggestions. Subscribe to The Gradient Podcast:  Apple Podcasts  | Spotify | Pocket Casts | RSSFollow The Gradient on TwitterOutline:* (00:00) Intro* (01:15) David’s interest in rationality* (02:45) David’s crisis of confidence, models abstracted from psychology* (05:00) Blending formal models with studies of the mind* (06:25) Interaction between academic communities* (08:24) Recognition of and incentives for interdisciplinary work* (09:40) Movement towards interdisciplinary work* (12:10) The Standard Picture of rationality* (14:11) Why the Standard Picture was attractive* (16:30) Violations of and rebellion against the Standard Picture* (19:32) Mistakes made by critics of the Standard Picture* (22:35) Other competing programs vs Standard Picture* (26:27) Characterizing Bounded Rationality* (27:00) A worry: faculties criticizing themselves* (29:28) Self-improving critique and longtermism* (30:25) Central claims in bounded rationality and controversies* (32:33) Heuristics and formal theorizing* (35:02) Violations of Standard Picture, vindicatory epistemology* (37:03) The Reason Responsive Consequentialist View (RRCV)* (38:30) Objective and subjective pictures* (41:35) Reason responsiveness* (43:37) There are no epistemic norms for inquiry* (44:00) Norms vs reasons* (45:15) Arguments against epistemic nihilism for belief* (47:30) Norms and self-delusion* (49:55) Difficulty of holding beliefs for pragmatic reasons* (50:50) The Gibbardian picture, inquiry as an action* (52:15) Thinking how to act and thinking how to live — the power of inquiry* (53:55) Overthinking and conducting inquiry* (56:30) Is thinking how to inquire as an all-things-considered matter?* (58:00) Arguments for the RRCV* (1:00:40) Deciding on minimal criteria for the view, stereotyping* (1:02:15) Eliminating stereotypes from the theory* (1:04:20) Theory construction in epistemology and moral intuition* (1:08:20) Refusing theories for moral reasons and disciplinary boundaries* (1:10:30) The argument from minimal criteria, evaluating against competing views* (1:13:45) Comparing to other theories* (1:15:00) The explanatory argument* (1:17:53) Parfit and Railton, norms of friendship vs utility* (1:20:00) Should you call out your friend for being a womanizer* (1:22:00) Vindicatory Epistemology* (1:23:05) Panglossianism and meliorative epistemology* (1:24:42) Heuristics and recognition-driven investigation* (1:26:33) Rational inquiry leading to irrational beliefs — metacognitive processing* (1:29:08) Stakes of inquiry and costs of metacognitive processing* (1:30:00) When agents are incoherent, focuses on inquiry* (1:32:05) Indirect normative assessment and its consequences* (1:37:47) Against the Singularity Hypothesis* (1:39:00) Superintelligence and the ontological argument* (1:41:50) Hardware growth and general intelligence growth, AGI definitions* (1:43:55) Difficulties in arguing for hyperbolic growth* (1:46:07) Chalmers and the proportionality argument* (1:47:53) Arguments for/against diminishing growth, research productivity, Moore’s Law* (1:50:08) On progress studies* (1:52:40) Improving research productivity and technology growth* (1:54:00) Mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk, longtermist epistemics* (1:55:30) Cumulative and per-unit risk* (1:57:37) Back and forth with longtermists, time of perils* (1:59:05) Background risk — risks we can and can’t intervene on, total existential risk* (2:00:56) The case for longtermism is inflated* (2:01:40) Epistemic humility and longtermism* (2:03:15) Knowledge production — reliable sources, blog posts vs peer review* (2:04:50) Compounding potential errors in knowledge* (2:06:38) Group deliberation dynamics, academic consensus* (2:08:30) The scope of longtermism* (2:08:30) Money in effective altruism and processes of inquiry* (2:10:15) Swamping longtermist options* (2:12:00) Washing out arguments and justified belief* (2:13:50) The difficulty of long-term forecasting and interventions* (2:15:50) Theory of change in the bounded rationality program* (2:18:45) OutroLinks:* David’s homepage and Twitter and blog* Papers mentioned/read* Bounded rationality and inquiry* Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?* Against the newer evidentialists* The accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition* There are no epistemic norms of inquiry* Permissive metaepistemology* Global priorities and effective altruism* What David likes about EA* Against the singularity hypothesis (+ blog posts)* Three mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk (+ blog posts)* The scope of longtermism* Epistemics Get full access to The Gradient at thegradientpub.substack.com/subscribe